Introduction
For about the last fifteen years, economists have been concerned with the microeconomic foundations of employment theory. Friedman (1968) defined the concept of the natural rate of unemployment as "the level that would be ground out by the Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations,. ,"
Generating unemployment in Walrasian frameworks has proved to be difficult to date, While such paradigms can easily provide a determination of equilibrium employment, making the jump to modelling equilibrium unemployment has proven to be elusive. Introducing "frictions" to labor market trade would seem to be an obvious place to start when trying to formulate theories of equilibrium unemployment. This is more difficult than it seems, though, with many attempts along these lines having limited success in this regard.
As a case in point, consider the implicit labor contracting model in environments with asymmetric information as formulated by Azariadis (1983) , Grossman and Hart (1983) , and others--see Hart (1983) for a survey of this literature.
Here workers contract with firms for a wage/employment package designed to stabilize labor income in the face of fluctuations in economic activity. since only firms observe the underlying shocks affecting the economy, workers will believe entrepreneurs' declarations that a "bad"
state-of-the-world has occured only if, at the time of wage cuts, an observable such as employment is also sufficiently reduced. This necessity for contracts to be written in a manner that ensures entrepreneurs truthfully report the state-of-the-world can result in the "underemployment" of labor relative to a world with symmetric information, in the sense that average hours per worker is lower. 1 It does not result in any agents being unemployed, though, Thus, while such contracting can lead to real wage rigidity and underemployment, it does not in and of itself result in unemployment.
A notable exception which does bridge the hiatus between modelling employment and unemployment in Walrasian frameworks is the seminal equilibrium search model developed by Lucas and Prescott (1974) . Here, an aggregate economy made up of many individual markets subject to idiosyncratic disturbances is constructed. Given the stochastic structure of the economy, a worker is continually undertaking calculations to decide whether or not it is in his best interest to quit his current job in a particular industry and enter a search process in pursuit of a higher return to work effort elsewhere. The model generates a natural rate of unemployment together with equilibrium distributions of wages, employment, and unemployment across
industries.
An alternative approach to modelling unemployment in Walrasian frameworks has recently been advanced by Rogerson (1985) . Here the gap between the notions of equilibrium employment and unemployment is bridged by intrOducing indivisibilities into economic agents' labor supply decisions.
Such nonconvexities turn out to be capable of generating unemployment within the context of equilibrium models. Rogerson also shows how these indivisibilities can be handled by a simple extension to the standard competitive equilibrium construct. The fact that simple modifications of the standard competitive equilibrium model can be applied to model what many may view as intrinsically "non-market clearing" phenomena has recently been stressed by Prescott and Townsend (1984) .
Drawing on Rogerson's work, Hansen (1985) situations exist where old workers can never be laid off so long as new workers are being hired or some agents are working overtime. Finally, some discussion of the determinants of the relative consumption and welfare levels of the employed versus unemployed is undertaken.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
The second section contains a general description of the economic environment to be employed. In the third section the representative agent's optimization problem is cast. For the second period, the probability of an agent being called in to firm and the worker agree on the probability ¢~(w) that the individual will be chosen to work in the second period conditional on the fact that he was employed in the first period, and on the probability ¢~(u) that he will work in the second period conditional on the fact that he was unemployed in the In pursuit of this end, the utility function~(.) will be
period is independent of his employment history, a fact evident from (6) and (7), so that c~= c~= c 1 , and C~(j) = c 2 for i,j = w,u. The concavity and solution in the current situation--that is a determination of c 1 ' c Z ' ¢~, ¢;(W), ¢~(w)--is given by the following analogues to (2), (3), (8), (9), and (16) and (17) Therefore, since the right-hand sides of (16) and (17) [
This question is answered by the Proposition 2: Suppose that V (.) is either strictly positive or negative 12
for all values of 11,12E[0,~J. Then
if and only if V (x,i)
Since V (0) > 0, then V (O,X) < V (~,x) and, by (26), the left side of (25) 
The desired result then follows from the 
